Wind turbines are often perceived as benign. This can be attributed to the population majority dwelling in urban locations distant from most wind turbines. Society may understate the risk to individuals living near turbines due to an overstatement of the perceived benefits of turbines, and an understatement of the risk of injury from falling turbine parts, or shed ice. Flaws in risk calculation may be attributed to a less than fully developed safety culture. Indications of this are the lack of a comprehensive industry failure database, and safety limits enabling the industry growth, but not protective of the public. A comprehensive study of wind turbine failures and risks in the Canadian province of Ontario gives data to enable validation of existing failure models. Failure probabilities are calculated, to show risk on personal property, or in public spaces. Repeated failures, and inadequate safety separation show public safety is not currently assured. A method of calculating setbacks from wind turbines to mitigate public risk is shown. Wind turbines with inadequate setbacks can adversely impact public health both directly from physical risk and indirectly by irritation from loss of safe use of property. Physical public safety setbacks are separate from larger setbacks required to prevent irritation from noise and other stressors, particularly when applied to areas of learning, rest and recuperation. The insights provided by this paper can assist the industry to enhance its image and improve its operation, as well as helping regulators set safety guidelines assuring protection of the public.
Introduction
The public safety risk posed by wind turbines requires a study of the frequency of accidents or incidents that may cause consequential harm to the public. It is different than looking at harm to employees injured at work. Usually public safety refers to direct health impacts, of injury or death, but this study also looks at how the health impacts may be indirect, caused by the irritation that itself results in stress and harm.
The overall goal of the study was to determine if existing regulations, protective barriers, and mitigation strategies assured public safety. A corollary goal was to identify changes that might be required, to assist the industry, and regulators assure public protection.
The study began with a literature search conducted using Google Scholar, with the criteria "wind turbine" AND "public safety" OR "risk". Relevant files suggested are identified in this paper.
Consideration of factors that might bias public acceptance of wind turbine failures either in a positive or negative manner were sought to avoid prejudice.
The existing safety culture of the wind turbine industry was studied by comparing it to the safety culture existing in mature industries, using the nuclear industry as an example.
Contribution to public safety risk from turbine failures was studied through a detailed examination of seven verified failures that have occurred in the lifetime operation of 2546 industrial wind turbines in the Canadian province of Ontario to show how each resulted in wind turbine blade parts on the ground. This examination was undertaken to ensure that all known failure modes that might harm the public were considered. Failures of smaller wind turbines and failures that did not result in significant blade pieces hitting the ground so they might adversely impact the public were eliminated.
From the seven failures identified the wind turbine failure rate was calculated in a manner consistent with that done in a mature industry. The failure rates identified were compared to the typical "bathtub curve" of failure rates to determine if the failures were indicative of a normal operating service period, and can thus be used to predict future failure rates with confidence.
The public safety harm from wind turbine failures were compared to harm from other public safety issues to identify anomalies.
The examination of the seven verified failures was expanded by considering the contribution for ice shed from wind turbines which is a public safety risk common to all wind turbines operating in an environment where icing can occur.
The methods used to calculate public safety risk from wind turbine accidents and icing was examined to identify logical shortcomings.
Finally, conclusions of the study were identified.
Methods
The literature search identified a very relevant basis as to how the world perceives risk. An academic PhD dissertation by Greg Klaus [1] Angeles. Starr's paper [2] , identified that the individual acceptance of "involuntary risk" over which they perceived they had no control, varied as the third-power relationship of the benefit they expected to receive by incurring the risk. Starr expressed this in terms of wage, but presumably it could by extension be extended to other benefits the individual might feel about the threat to global existence posed by climate change, and the benefit that converting the electrical supply to wind turbine-generated power would yield. A perceived benefit would suggest acceptance of higher risks due to the exponential nature of the benefit to risk relationship identified by Starr. Typical of many of the papers, examples from pointed out that "Engineering developments involving new technology are likely to appear in many places simultaneously and to become deeply ingrained into the systems of our society before their impact is evident or measureable." He carries on, "Thus, we now face a general situation in which widespread use of a new technological development may occur before its societal impact can be properly assessed." • Crude oil supplied 33.9%
• Coal supplied 28.6%
• Natural gas supplied 24.6%
• Traditional biomass supplied 7.3%
• Hydropower supplied 2.7%
• Nuclear supplied 1.7%
• Wind generators supplied 0.6%
• Renewables other than hydro, wind, traditional biofuels or solar supplied 0.4%
• Solar supplied 0.2%
Equipped with a more realistic view of the impact of wind generation on meeting an increasing world primary energy need, we can now turn our attention to the public safety risk impacts of wind generators as identified in the Introduction, presenting the "Findings" that arose from each aspect of the study results.
One area of Public Safety not included in the scope of this paper was the risk to aircraft. It is known that fixed wing small aircraft and rotary wing helicopters often used by Air Ambulance services may fly at altitudes where they are at risk of interference from land based wind turbines that have moving blades 200 metres above ground level, some of which are not fully charted on air navigation charts. Aircraft safety is considered to be a specialty beyond the scope of this paper.
Results

Finding 1 -Safety Culture in Wind Versus Mature
Industry
Any discussion of public safety risk in an industry has to consider the question of safety culture in • Regulator -Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
• Regulator -United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
• International Advisory Agency -International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Industry Association -World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
• Industry Association -Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in the USA
• Operator -Électricité de France (EDF)
• Operator -Bruce Power (in Canada)
Safety culture recognizes the need for continuous improvement, and to achieve that the sharing of information about adverse incidents, or operating experience about best practices in a learning atmosphere. The World Association of Nuclear Operators recognizes that "operating experience is highly valued and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed." [7] The industry recognizes and encourages sharing of experience by programs such as the IAEA • A "text-mining" paper in 2017 [11] that studied wind turbine accidents notes, "As of January 2016, the most extensive data available on the Internet on wind turbines accidents was published by the Caithness Windfarm Information Forum (CWIF)."
• A second 2017 [12] paper that presents a general review of typical wind turbine mechanical failures also references the Caithness database as it's source of information about blade failures.
• Even in 2018, another paper [13] .
The pharmaceutical industry carefully tracks low failure rates. The European Drug Regulatory Agency (EMA -European Medicines Agency) defines "rare" as affecting between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000. Similarly, they define "very rare" as affecting less than 1 in 10,000. These are the same levels of definition for "rare", and "very rare" adverse drug reaction as used by the World Health Organization.
[15]:
Very common >= 1/10
Common (frequent) >= 1/100 and < 1/10
Uncommon (infrequent) >= 1/1000 and < 1/100
Rare >= 1/10,000 and < 1/1000
Very rare < 1/10,000
By ) might be considered as "uncommon" but certainly not "extremely rare" as described by the industry.
Another comparison of the difference between a mature industry and an immature one with regard to safety culture can be seen in the response to technical issues of concern that arise. In nuclear plant accident management principles it is common to have at least one senior individual maintain an overview of the progression of events of an accident, without being directly involved in the routine decision making steps.
The reason for this is to avoid the common failing of In a mature industry, dealing with identified concerns is important. It is not sufficient to ignore the concern, or to use the excuse "it has never happened before". The industry with a mature safety culture will disposition the identified concern and either show why:
• The event cannot happen, or
• What mitigating barriers are in place to prevent harm from occurring, or For an individual impacted by wind turbines, the relevant risk is not the risk averaged over the year, but the risk at the time the individual is exposed to the risk.
The first conclusions of the Starr paper are also relevant to our study:
1) The indications are that the public is willing to accept "voluntary" risks roughly 1000 times greater than "involuntary" risks.
2) The statistical risk of death from disease appears to be a psychological yardstick for establishing the level of acceptability of other risks.
3) The acceptability of risk appears to be crudely proportional to the third power of the benefits (real or imagined).
4) The social acceptance of risk is directly influenced by public awareness of the benefits of an activity, as determined by advertising, usefulness, and the number of people participating.
The study of safety considerations from large wind turbines has a considerable history. The earliest relevant paper determined by the Google Scholar search described for this paper was written in 1979, by Dwight
Reilly [18] In the deterministic safety analysis in the nuclear industry for example [40] , the analysis starts with identifying possible initiating events that can impact public safety, and then determines that barriers are in place to prevent the initiating event from causing a public safety impact greater than acceptable limits. The industry then proceeds to also conduct a probabilistic safety assessment [41] , that considers the have not happened. Still, the analysts must start out with a deterministic assessment to ensure protection against known accident sequences.
The critical beginning point for any safety assessment is to determine the possible initiating events, and this is why having a database of known accidents is so important.
We begin in this paper by considering real data for accidents that may harm the public. Rather than looking at hypothetical accidents, we consider ones that we have fairly good confidence of the consequences of the accident. For this we will focus on real accidents that have occurred to wind turbines in the province of
Ontario.
An assessment example is presented for the case of the 2546 industrial sized wind turbines in service the Canadian Province of Ontario by June 2018. Table 1 provides data for the 7 known failures in Ontario that resulted in blade pieces on the ground. • No debris from the tower to a distance 150 m from the tower.
• Debris 1.2 m x 3.6 m at a distance 150 m from the tower.
• Debris 1 m x 3.6 m at a distance 170 m from the tower.
• Debris 1.2 m x 3.0 m at a distance 210 m from the tower.
• Debris 1.2 m x 3.0 m at a distance 280 m from the tower.
• Debris 1.0 m x 0.15 m at a distance 560 m from tower.
• • Detail of the specifics of the failed wind turbinesize, type, and time in service.
• Details of the exposure time in service.
The reason for tracking the exposure time for the failed turbine is to be able to make an assessment of the failure compared to the well-known "bathtub" curve of failure rates. A description of this may be found in the papers:
• "The Bathtub Curve and Product Failure Behaviour" -Part One -The Bathtub Curve, Infant Mortality and Burn in. [45] • "The Bathtub Curve and Product Failure Behaviour" -Part Two -Normal Life and Wear-Out. [46] A simplified version of "The Bathtub Curve" for failure behavior is shown in Figure 8 .
The figure shows that when a component is new, or a new design is introduced, the failure rate is typically higher during the prototype testing. At some In a similar manner as to tracking the lifetime failure rate of components in a nuclear plant, it is important that the failure data be for similar components so that the results can be representative. Some papers have presented information about the desirability of being able to specify accident modes more precisely, so as to be able to prepare a detailed probabilistic risk assessment, to show the true root cause of a consequential failure. While this is a desirable objective, unfortunately the information available in public databases is not sufficiently detailed to be able to determine the root cause in most cases. As an example of the lack of data we will consider the failure in January Presumably, a more detailed fault tree might also include these other possibilities for a tower collapse:
• Overspeed of blades, resulting in blade tip contacting tower arising from:
 Brake failure following separation of turbine from electrical grid.
 Gearbox failure, resulting in rotor speed increasing.
 Control system failure allowing nonasynchronous turbines to accelerate.
 Control system failure allowing an asynchronous turbine to overload, increasing blade bending until contact occurs.
• Overload of turbine, increasing blade bending, resulting in contact from:
 Cold weather operation, increasing air density.
 High winds coupled with control system failure to shutdown turbine.
Because not all of the wind turbines in Ontario were placed in service at the same time, calculation of the failure rate needs to consider both the time in service at the time of each failure, plus the total time in service of Ontario wind turbines at the time of the failure, as shown in Table 2 .
In Table 2 , not only is the arithmetic failure rate
shown, but also the statistical Chi Squared Confidence Chi-squared confidence level failure rate will be quite a bit higher than the pure arithmetical failure rate.
However, as the number of failures grows, and the total years in service grow, then the Chi-squared confidence level failure rate becomes closer to the arithmetical failure rate.
The failure rate for the arithmetical value and the Chi-squared value against the years in service is shown in Figure 9 . The frequency of death of youth due to anaphylaxis is less than 1 in 2 years, or 1 in 400,000 exposure years of potentially impacted children, a frequency of 2.5 x 10 -6
.
To protect vulnerable members of society subject to this accidental rate, every school, and many recreational facilities that one may enter in the province of Ontario has a sign on the door noting that the facility is "nut- • 10 Jan 1998 -"There was some ice build up on blades during a freezing rain event, all ice fell off and unit ran OK" "Many ice pieces, largest piece was 12x12x2 inches, pieces up to 100 m from tower" Additionally, the report states,
• "the major drawback of using the (Seifert) formulas (for ice shed) is the fact that the dependency of the ice throw risk on the wind statistics under typical icing conditions is neglected."
• "the effect of breaking ice while flying through the air has not yet been examined."
• "there is a clear lack of validation data for the simulation results." The recommended work in references [69] and [70] for prevention of icing of wind turbine blades, The IWAIS paper quotes from earlier work that an unprotected human is at risk of fatality if hit by a piece of ice with kinetic impact energy above 40 Joules, and weight above 100 g. They also show that a car window can be broken by impact energy above 140
Joules, so they estimate that a driver or passenger could The Winterwind presentation goes on to state; the impact energy depends on ice density, mass, and velocity. Impact of 40 J corresponds to:
• 200 g of ice falling from 30-50m
• 500 g of ice falling from 5-6m
To perform a quick verification calculation an ice piece 10 cm x 10 cm x 2 cm was assumed (mass about Simple acceleration due to gravity tells us that the distance travelled "s" is a function of the original velocity "V 0 ", the (constant) acceleration due to gravity "a" and the time the object falls "t". 
Finding 6 -Flaws in calculation of Risk from falling Ice or Blades
Many papers perform a calculation to determine the risk of a wind turbine accident to harm a member of the population. The "Dutch Handbook" Handboek Risicozonering Windturbines [10] , identifies in its Table 4 that "vulnerable objects" such as homes, hospitals, and schools are to be maintained outside a 10 -6 risk contour, which they identify as the larger of (mast height + ½ rotor diameter) or the maximum casting distance at nominal speed. The latter value varies depending on the turbine specifics, but they define in Tables 2 and 3 of The logical flaw is the assumption that the ice falls equally distributed around the turbine in any ice fall incident. In reality, as was demonstrated by the photo time sequence in Figure 11 of this paper, the ice fall is not equally distributed over the entire area, but is concentrated in a downwind sector. This is also the concern noted previously in the Swedish "Elforsk" study [69] . Similar to the blade debris field shown in Handbook Handboek Risicozonering Windturbines [10] or the level of protection that is provided for school children that may have food allergies in Ontario.
The states, "An appellant must prove on a balance of probabilities that harm will occur, rather than it may or is likely to occur." It became apparent that this requirement of the regulatory process would require that a revolver with 6-cartridge capability is loaded with no fewer than 4 bullets before one plays "Russian
Roulette." Any less than 4 bullets could only establish that holding the gun to one's forehead and pulling the trigger "may or is likely to cause harm" but it would not prove "on a balance of probabilities" that it "will cause harm." Helping legislators, regulators, tribunals, and the public understand that public safety principles require a higher level of protection than requiring that the project "will cause harm" became the basis for this paper. 
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